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Going via Bernard Stiegler’s theorisation of technology, and his response to Chris Anderson’s 
claim that the era of hyper-networked, algorithmically-driven digital technologies signals the 
end of theory (Anderson, 2008), this paper aims to place the educational practice of 
networked learning as a space to think the edge, excess or limit of this proposed algorithmic 
dominance. I discuss how networked learning can negotiate the border between educational 
theory, the practice of teaching and learning, and the processes and systems of educational 
technology, but suggest that to do this it must engage these disciplines through a thinking of 
technology which does not decide upon its status in advance. I argue that affirming this 
particular relation to technology is increasingly urgent given we are at a moment in which 








The ‘digital turn’ of the early 1990s saw the first stage of mass public internet access and the 
integration of digital networked technologies on a hyper-industrial scale. For the philosopher 
and cultural theorist Bernard Stiegler, such a period (a period marked by the introduction of 
platforms such as Amazon, Google and Facebook), prompted a series of ontological traumas 
from which we are yet to recover. This included what Stiegler has previously called 
   
 
   
 
‘disorientation’ (see Stiegler, 2009), which has now mutated to become a state verging on 
‘generalised stupefaction’ (Stiegler, 2016, p. 25), and a certain widespread malaise. Stiegler 
suggests that such a generalised malaise is the result of an increasing shift to ever more 
sophisticated processes of automization as conditioned by networked digital technologies. 
When such technologies process data and provide responses at increasingly faster and faster 
speeds, the capacity to think is short-circuited, a tendency which, over time, slowly alienates 
an individual from the forms of knowledge which had previously been handed down and/or 
crafted over generations and across traditions. It is as a result of such a generalised state of 
alienation, or ‘proletarianizing tendency’ (Stiegler, 2016, p. 29), that Stiegler can both identify 
texts in which our capacity to theorise has begun to be questioned (Stiegler, 2016, p. 1), as well 
as himself appearing to endorse such a suggestion (Stiegler, 2016, p. 29). If these suggestions 
are correct, and the era of networked digital technologies has brought with it a generalised 
stupefaction which is also an erosion of our ability to think theoretically, then we are faced 
with a potential double-bind in which the network of platforms in which our everyday lives are 
– to a greater or lesser degree – embedded, are also the condition for the eradication of a 
capacity to think the impact of that very network. In other words, if we are to understand the 
potentially traumatic after-effects of such an overwhelming digital turn, we need to somehow 
reaffirm the very capacity to think before we succumb completely to the stunned paralysis from 
which thought may never recover.  
In this short paper, then, I want to approach this double-bind through the question of 
technology and its use in education, and will do this through a particular re-positioning of 
technology which recalls both Stiegler’s theorisation of technology and its indebtedness to 
deconstructive thought. I hope that this might give us space to re-affirm the possibility of theory 
as a certain pedagogical principle in higher education. Firstly, then, I will map the question of 
theory in the context of the ‘algorithmic governmentality’ as outlined by Thomas Berns and 
   
 
   
 
Antoinette Rouvroy (2013). This is a term to which Stiegler is indebted in his readings of 
digitally networked technologies, and can be aligned with some of the negative effects of mass 
automization. Indeed, Stiegler describes ‘algorithmic governmentality’ as the description of a 
‘new kind of economy’ which is based on ‘personal data, cookies, metadata, tags and other 
tracking technologies’, and through which methods from applied mathematics are placed in the 
service of ‘automated calculation’ (Stiegler, 2016, p. 1; and: Berns and Rouvroy, 2013, p. 163-
96). By situating algorithmic governmentality within what I will refer to as ‘algorithmic 
culture’, I want to highlight a potential response to its more detrimental effects, but one which 
is itself generated by the networked digital technologies through which algorithmic 
governmentality is played out. I do this because, somewhat inevitably, we have no other option 
but to accept the influence of the algorithm at every level, even in our attempts to think beyond 
it. It is for this reason that Stiegler’s work is so important to the paper; his ongoing attempt to 
work with the conditions and effects of hyper-industrial digital economies in order to think 
beyond them resists the fantasy of a position which may pre- or post-date our essential relation 
to technics. It is because of this that I want to keep ‘algorithmic culture’ as the sign of the 
positive excess of its governmental counterpart; I want to think the edge, excess or limit of 
algorithmic governmentality from within algorithmic governmentality, with a view to 
explicating a particular reading of technology which is not reducible to the digital, and which 
in turn might help re-affirm a notion of theory as that which has always exceeded any 
algorithmically determined definition or, indeed, eradication. 
The second strand of the paper will situate this argument in the context of higher 
education and consider a particularly niche area of academic discourse: networked learning. I 
focus on the latter because it is here that there seems to be a space for thinking through the 
relation between theory, technology and education at the very point at which networked 
learning is being cited as a space to address algorithmic culture (Jandrić, 2017). I will explore 
   
 
   
 
how, in its particular incarnation at Lancaster University, networked learning negotiates the 
border between educational theory, management education, and the practices and processes of 
(educational) technology, and I will conclude by suggesting how this particular instance of 
networked learning may offer an engagement with these disciplines through a horizon of 
technics which does not decide upon the status of technology in advance. I hope, then, that this 
paper will prepare the ground for a rethinking of the relationship between theory, technology 
and education at the very point at which educational institutions are asking themselves how to 
both respond to, and prepare our students for, an age of continuing technological disruption. 
 
I. 
It is no coincidence that the opening of Stiegler’s Automatic Society, a text which considers the 
possibility of the social within the context of generalised automation, begins with a reference 
to Chris Anderson’s Wired article entitled ‘The End of Theory: The Data Deluge Makes the 
Scientific Method Obsolete’. In it, Anderson concludes that:  
 
The new availability of huge amounts of data, along with the statistical tools to 
crunch these numbers, offers a whole new way of understanding the world. 
Correlation supersedes causation, and science can advance even without 
coherent models, unified theories, or really any mechanistic explanation at all 
(Anderson, 2008). 
 
For Stiegler, the driving force behind theory is desire. In the citation above we can see 
Anderson aligning the substitution of ideals such as coherence, unification and explanation for 
the statistical manipulation of (big) data. Whether or not we share these ideals, the point for 
   
 
   
 
Stiegler is that ‘the desirable in general is what consists’ and such ‘consistencies’ are also the 
object of theory. The practice of theory, therefore, equates to the desire for certain consistent 
objects, and for Stiegler, such consistencies, ‘in the psychic and collective individuation that 
constitutes the polis’, are presented as: 
 
• the just, which does not exist, but the idea of which is practically managed 
and conserved by law, which prescribes social ways of living in common, 
and promises a livable and polite [poli], if not actually just, world; 
• the true, of which geometry, in the Western experience of rationality, is 
the matrix and the canon, constituted through the ideality of the point, 
which does not exist, but which trans-forms the world through being 
contemplated theoretically, and through the practical consequences of this 
contemplation; 
• the beautiful, which is improbable, as Kant said, that is, unprovable, and 
as such ‘imaginary’ and ‘dreamed’, allowing us to dream, but which, 
experienced by the subject who judges aesthetically, puts to the test the 
singularity of his or her judgement and the object of this judgement, 
allowing this subject to individuate him- or herself and to do so as this 
dreamer – sometimes to the point of becoming an artist (Stiegler, 2018, p. 
43-4). 
 
With an eradication of theory comes the eradication of the consistencies outlined above. It is 
clear, then, that much is at stake with the suggestion that the death of theory might also mean 
the death of such things as the ability to think, dream and individuate the law, truth, and the 
beautiful (as the very possibility of thinking the unprovable or even unthinkable). For Stiegler, 
   
 
   
 
because ‘the objects of such consistencies [law, truth and beauty] are also those of theories, 
the latter presuppose the learning and apprenticeship of affective and erotic idealization [… 
consequently] when the libidinal economy lies in ruin, so too does theory’ (Stiegler, 2018, p. 
44). From this, we can suggest that a society in which theory has been erased would equate to 
one in which desire (as ‘effective and erotic idealization’) has also been ruined. Theory requires 
the erotic idealization of consistencies such as the law, truth and beauty. Moreover, it is almost 
certainly the case that one of the best opportunities to develop a relation to idealized 
consistencies is through the apprenticeship into disciplinary thinking which is gained through 
tertiary education. In turn, we can now see how an eradication of the capacity for theoretical 
thinking would also provide the conditions for a diminished notion of what the intellectual life 
of the individual might be.  
At the same time, however, and as indicated above, the information and communication 
networks upon which the statistical manipulation of big data and subsequent ‘death of theory’ 
is predicated, are the same networks which must pave the way for a reaffirmation of the 
consistencies upon which theory depends. This recalls the pharmakological logic at the heart 
of all technology, which in a now familiar reading made by Jacques Derrida in ‘Plato’s 
Pharmacy’ (Derrida, 1981, p. 61-171), we are alerted to the fact that Plato represents the 
technique or technics of writing via the Greek term: φάρμακον (phármakon). Derrida’s reading 
highlights that this term, which can signify a charm, philtre, drug, remedy, poison, potion or 
spell, renders a notion of technics as that which can have both poisonous and remedial effects. 
Derrida also outlines how the technics of orthographic inscription were described in these 
terms, and then maps some of the profound implications. In doing this, he makes a crucial 
reading of the pharmakon which, despite its familiarity in contemporary critical thought on 
(digital) technology, has not been followed through to its most radical implications:  
 
   
 
   
 
The pharmakon has no ideal identity; it is aneidetic, firstly because it is not 
monoeidetic (in the sense in which the Phaedo speaks of the eidos as something 
simple, noncomposite: monoeides). This ‘medicine’ is not a simple thing. But 
neither is it a composite, a sensible or empirical suntheton partaking of several 
simple essences. It is rather the prior medium in which differentiation in 
general is produced [my italics] (Derrida, 1981, p. 126). 
 
If the pharmakon describes the medium in which the play of difference is produced, indeed 
where such difference can’t be halted, then we can begin to see why such a dangerous 
supplement can be damaging to any attempt to delineate a stable definition of technology, or 
that which it is said to condition (i.e. the end or death of theory). In other words, because 
technology is always referring to this prior medium as the very possibility of differentiation, 
then it is also impossible to say exactly what a certain form or deployment of technology can 
or cannot do, or what it will or will not lead to. As the medium in which difference is produced, 
it is by definition the very possibility of a relation to the future as that which remains unknown. 
Referring to our argument above, this means that the technological milieu which sees 
the reduction of individuated desire to its manufactured, calculable and therefore marketable 
substitute, might also be that which can stimulate it. For Stiegler, this means that to get thought 
thinking again we must be able to ‘think algorithmic governmentality within algorithmic 
governmentality’ (Stielger, 2016, p. 128), which is to say that, as we are always-already 
immersed in the project of algorithmic governmentality, we must somehow turn it against itself 
by using it as the condition for a new concept and articulation of educational practice which 
can somehow outrun the ‘generalised proletarianisation’ which is at the heart of our current 
situation: 
   
 
   
 
 
Historically, proletarianization was the loss of workers’ knowledge to machines, 
which absorbed this knowledge. Today, proletarianization is the standardization 
of behaviours through marketing and services, and the mechanization of minds 
through the externalization of knowledge in systems, such that these ‘minds’ no 
longer know anything about these information processing devices, of which they 
merely set the parameters. This is precisely what the electronic mathematization 
of financial decision making shows, and it affects everyone: employers, doctors, 
designers, intellectuals, leaders. More and more engineers take part in technical 
processes whose functioning they know nothing about, but which are ruining the 
world (Stiegler, 2011; quoted in Berns and Rouvroy, 2013).  
 
As Stiegler has consistently and convincingly argued, the algorithmically driven capture of the 
capacity for noetic activity is the latest stage in the proletarianisation of human life by 
technological development, a phase which began with the ‘submission of the body of the 
labourer to mechanical traces inscribed in machines’ (the proletarianisation of work-
knowledge), and which went on to capture ‘life-knowledge’ through the analogue traces of 
technologies such as television and broadcast media in general. Such knowledge is 
proletarianised because, like the subsumption of the worker’s skills, techniques and knowledge 
into the machine that will automate and reproduce that know-how ad infinitum, analogue and 
digital technologies have perfected that process by which intellectual activity has been short-
circuited but the capturing of attention. In this sense, desire is now manufactured en masse and 
transmitted to individuals through marketing and advertising techniques, as opposed to its slow 
growth and nurturing via the contemplation of consistencies that an apprenticeship in 
   
 
   
 
disciplinary thinking would introduce. Desire, then, (if we can still call it that) is produced for 
the people, rather than it being a product of the people. Part of the task in hand, then, is the 
rebuilding of social, cultural and political milieux as spaces for the nurturing and caring for 
intellectual activity; an intellectual activity which is driven by a notion of desire which is 
defined by the very consistencies which it seeks. 
I want to argue that this places theoretical thinking – which depends upon a desire for 
consistencies such as the law, truth and beautiful – as central to this rebuilding. What is more, 
such a positioning of theory must embrace the hyperindustrial networks of digital technologies 
which connect everyone and everything and which provide the conditions for the reduction of 
thought to calculable, efficient and ultimately profitable data, and turn them on their heads into 
spaces for the de-proletarianisation of noetic life. This is the space of an algorithmic culture 
that, through the pharmacological medium of differential technics, exists within the 
governmentality of the networks only in order to exceed that calculable realm. By referring to 
this as the chance of algorithmic culture, I want to name that opportunity for thinking 
algorithmic governmentality otherwise, an opportunity to affirm a future which isn’t calculable 
or determined in advance, and which is the very condition of the consistencies upon which 
theory is based. In this sense, technics becomes a horizon for a theory which cannot be 
determined as living or dead. It is therefore impossible for any particular technology (whether 
digital or not) to eradicate the capacity to think theoretically when that thinking is directed 
towards, and conditioned by, a future which is irreducible to algorithmic prediction. In the final 
section, then, I will try to demonstrate how this can be considered a little more pragmatically 
through the practice of networked learning. I want to suggest that it is here that we might affirm 
a horizon of technics which does not decide upon the status of technology in advance, and that 
it is because of this particular theorization of technics that we can begin to think an educational 
practice fit for the age of algorithmic culture, as opposed to a practice that is determined in 
   
 
   
 




Referring to ‘algorithmic governmentality’ as ‘the thoroughly computational capitalism that is 
establishing an era of absolute non-knowledge’ Stiegler begins to outline the ‘associated 
milieu’ which conditions such an era: 
 
In this absolute non-knowledge, knowledge itself disintegrates into the 
information generated by fully automated calculation, and into fixed capital, 
which, along with ‘big data’, forms the hyper-synchronized associated milieu 
[…] produced by the applied mathematics of correlational algorithms. In this 
hyper-synchronised milieu, the diachronic can no longer exteriorize itself other 
than diabolically, that is, outside of any circuit of transindividuation, or in other 
words, outside of any synchronic metastability (Stiegler, 2017). 
 
This particularly negative milieu is also referred to by Stiegler as the ‘Digital Leviathan’ 
(Stiegler, 2016), or, as Ross Abbinnett suggests, an ‘arche-programme’: ‘that is, a totality of 
systems each of which develops in relation to a universal principle of efficient transfer of 
knowledge, information and value’; ‘the system of discrete modalities of digital representation 
and manipulation that simultaneously analyse, anticipate and synchronize the production of 
libidinal energy’ (Abbinnett, 2018, p. 8 & 40). What all these definitions have in common is a 
   
 
   
 
networked environment, but one in which Stiegler seems to read a certain nuanced and 
ambiguous quality: 
 
There is no “territory” without a network; there is always only a network, as 
framework: territory’s simple unity is mythical […] The fact that the territory 
is already framed, that it is nothing other than the network-to-come, does not 
mean that the conditions for such a framing are always the same; it occurs 
within a particular typology and a general history of such conditions […] The 
materialization (objectification) of such frameworks is also the dynamic of 
their alienation or de-realization; their exteriorization. Networks affect and dis-
affect, organize and disorganize rhythms and memories. The network is in this 
sense programmatic. (Stiegler, 2009a, p. 144; cited in Abbinnett, 2018, p. 50) 
 
The network is programmatic, but according to an inherently ambiguous, or pharmakological, 
logic. It is this phenomenon of the network, by which it (dis)organises and (de)realises the 
dynamic of everything that is (dis)connects, that I want to emphasise when we look at the 
notion of networked learning as both a pathway for the intensification of calculable thought, as 
well as the possibility of its excess.  
In a now familiar but useful definition, networked learning can be thought of as 
‘learning in which information and communications technology (ICT) is used to promote 
connections: between one learner and other learners; between learners and tutors; between a 
learning community and its learning resources.’ (Goodyear, Banks, Hodgson, & McConnell, 
2004, p. 1). Looked at through a pharmakological lens, I would argue that the resulting effect 
of a networked learning would be to make all these categories tremble, and yet this particular 
   
 
   
 
phenomenon of a networked approach to learning can easily be overlooked. In his 2015 text on 
networked learning, Chris Jones provides a useful overview of the theoretical genealogy of the 
network (Jones, 2015, p. 79). In the title of this section – a ‘Network of Network Theories’ - 
Jones, perhaps somewhat unwittingly, gives us an image of the network as the very thing which 
puts its conceptual determination into question. That is, the ambiguous logic of a networked 
series of definitions provides a programmatic (dis)aggregation or (dis)assembling of any kind 
of self-contained conception of the network. As there is no one concept of the network, neither 
the network, nor that which is produced through it, can be reduced to a calculable quantity, be 
it a discipline, an identity, an outcome, a position or an intention. It seems to make sense, then, 
to suggest that the potential of higher educational practice to perform a critique of, or response 
to, algorithmic governance lies in its ability to somehow maintain the paradoxical network 
effects outlined above. In other words, in an age of networked digital technologies, most of 
which now seem to be put to work to install some kind of algorithmic governmentality, higher 
education also needs to operate under the same networked conditions and become something 
which can think or critique this position from within. Some form of ‘networked’ learning seems 
well positioned to perform such an operation, but if it is to somehow organise the 
disorganisation of the calculable, or work towards consistencies which are not immanent to a 
calculable end-point of learning (what might also be thought of as a learning with and from the 
other), then it must also affirm, and work with, the often unacknowledged (in)determinacy 
which is at its heart. 
Indeed, Jones does himself get some way to suggesting that networked learning, if it is 
to work towards some of its more socially engaged themes, must begin to makes those themes 
a little more apparent: ‘networked learning has rarely engaged with the broader political 
landscape […] and this is becoming a more pressing concern in the current global recession 
because of the severe pressures placed on higher education by economic conditions’ (Jones, 
   
 
   
 
2015, p. 42). My concern, as outlined above, is that such an engagement would require a fairly 
radical shift in the way that networked learning theorises the technology which is core to it. 
One of the attractions of networked learning has always been the inability to truly define itself 
(something which Jones’ text implicitly evidences). It seems no coincidence that such 
indeterminacy is inherent to a form of educational or academic practice which has the notion 
of the network at its very heart. For me this is because the actual technics of the network has 
an ‘essential’ relation to the pharmakological medium of difference which Derrida saw as the 
very (non)essence of technology. This is why, in an interesting distinction between social 
networks and a network society, Jones can state that: ‘network society cannot be reduced to 
either networks or to social networks, because both networks and social networks have long 
histories which predate digital technologies (Jones, 2015, p. 37). I would take this a little further 
to suggest that the network predates the social in that, as a medium of difference, it becomes 
its very condition. In other words, the social is always a certain effect of technics, but of a 
generalised or originary technics, the dynamic or economies of which the notion of the network 
will always be inscribed.1 
In a recent chapter, Petar Jandrić has also come close to Jones’ call for a more socially 
engaged instance of networked learning. When discussing the potential for a ‘critical’ 
networked learning to be linked to transdisciplinary and/or multidisciplinary modes of 
working, he states: 
 
Disciplinarity, multidisciplinarity, and interdisciplinarity are imbued within the 
existing social and technoscientific orders. In spite of significant 
epistemological and practical achievements, therefore, these methodological 
                                                            
1 For a particularly useful exploration and explanation of ‘originary technicity’ see: Bradley, 2011. 
   
 
   
 
approaches are structurally unable to provide radical social change. 
Transdisciplinarity and antidisciplinarity are better suited for critical 
networked learning, as their position outside of dominant disciplinary power 
relationships provides genuine potential for emancipation and social 
transformation (Jandrić, 2016, p. 178). 
 
Although I am not certain that the prefixes ‘trans’ and ‘anti’ do enough to avoid the structures 
and power relationships that Jandrić suggests they might, not least because the very notion of 
the network would make that move impossible to fully complete, Jandrić does associate a 
radical emancipatory potential with a criticality that networked learning could generate. Such 
a combination would, however, require us to remain within existing social and technoscientific 
structures in order to think them at their limit. For Stiegler, this would require us to put the 
network to work in such a way as to combat the hyper-synchronicity in which a fully calculable 
world would result. A thinking which could both comprehend, and think beyond such a milieu 
would be one which situates diachronicity within Stiegler’s ‘circuit of transindividuation’. 
Providing the conditions for such a circuit is a role that a critical networked learning might 
play; embedding a critical practice within a circuit which resurrects the desire for the thinking 
of consistencies across time, would allow us to both work within and beyond our increasingly 
hyper-synchronised milieu.  
A networked learning which encourages this would, however, require a relationship to 
technology which does not reduce that term to a description of a mechanism for achieving aims 
decided elsewhere. Instead, such a relationship would affirm a certain generalised 
technological horizon of an educational practice which does not seek to delimit or define 
technology within that horizon as something which can be added or removed at will, according 
   
 
   
 
to prior, predestined and/or calculable goals. Such a relationship would also prevent us from 
privileging the more reductive but familiar interpretation of technology as simply the more 
efficient cure to a flabby, outdated (educational) system. At this point then, we might argue 
that we should refer to this generalised horizon of technology by the Greek term tekhnē. This 
term, which is the etymological foundation to the word ‘technics’ and thus ‘technology’, also 
recalls a prior definition which relates to an art, craft or skill. Derrida’s reading of the 
pharmakon, however, which begins to bring a thinking of technology into alignment with the 
medium in which difference is produced, suggests that even tekhnē is a fairly strict delimitation 
of a dimension which will always exceed it. But by affirming this quasi-originary dimension 
(which is ‘quasi’ because it can never actually be reached or thought other that in its more 
particular, material or empirical exemplars) as the horizon of a new form of educational 
practice, and one that a critical networked learning might embody, we might also approach the 
conditions for a new relationship to knowledge, and to what Stiegler – following Foucault – 
refers to as ‘the era of a new epistēmē’ (Stiegler, 2017, section 4). This would, in turn, go some 
way towards preparing the ground for Peter Goodyear and Lina Markauskaite’s more 
pragmatic call for tertiary education to show leadership in the area of ‘epistemic fluency’ 
(Goodyear & Markauskaite, 2018), and my own extension of this towards something that might 
be termed ‘epistemic health’ (Dawson, 2019). 
 
Discussion: 
To take us towards some concluding remarks, I want to briefly describe a specific project which 
encourages a networked learning approach to teaching and learning practices at Lancaster 
University, and more precisely a particular effect of this approach on academic identity. The 
project’s aim is to encourage academic staff to develop their teaching practice alongside a 
   
 
   
 
network of fellow academics, professional service staff and students, and which has so far 
resulted in a series of experimental teaching interventions. As the project is situated within the 
practice of networked learning, there is a focus on the use of digital technology within the 
planning, design and deployment stages of the project, and particularly as the University’s VLE 
provides the central method of organising the project in terms of regular communications 
between participants, sharing of notes/ideas, drafts etc.  But the project does not have an 
imperative for participants to embrace digital technology uncritically in their teaching practice. 
Indeed, one outcome of the project is that it formed a space to critique the call for more online 
and blended approaches. A further, and to some extent, unexpected outcome of the project was 
the formation of a smaller group of participants who wanted to think through their experiences 
of taking part, and particularly the shared sense of dislocation which the introduction of more 
technologically augmented teaching methods had provoked. What was in question, then, was 
identity of the academic, and in the following passage, a certain ‘loss of presence’:  
 
The ‘loss of presence’ occasioned by the shift to networked learning, and the 
need to develop a ‘new disembodied identity’ (Hanson, 2009, p. 561) which 
thus arises require the adoption of new roles by academics. When students 
become ‘discoverers and constructors of knowledge’ (Hartman, Dziuban and 
Brophy-Ellison, 2007, cited in Hanson, 2009, p. 556) then academics must 
become ‘co-discoverers’ and ‘co-constructors’ and accept the seeming loss of 
expert status which this implies (Iszatt-White, 2018, p. 6). 
 
All of the phrases used above to describe the changes in academic identity which a particular 
instance of networked learning has encouraged, can, I would argue, be considered the effects 
   
 
   
 
of a further shift in the notion of technology which the move to a networked learning approach 
has encouraged. Somewhat ironically, however, it was also the fact that as the project adhered 
to a networked learning approach, the staff involved found both the urgency, and the means, to 
reformulate and reflect upon their experience. In this sense, the practice of networked learning, 
and the greater emphasis placed on technology as the condition of the project’s deployment, 
has conditioned both the disorganisation and reorganisation of an academic identity, but with 
the latter becoming a less calculable and/or less stable phenomenon than that which may have 
been traditionally experienced. 
 It is important to remember that such a displacement of academic identity has always 
has the potential to occur; the project in discussion has merely up-fronted what is usually either 
repressed, denied or displaced by other more forceful or influential academic performances or 
identities. But a key point to take from Iszatt-White’s suggestion, is the notion of a ‘loss of 
presence’ or ‘disembodied identity’ which she could identify as a direct consequence of a shift 
to networked learning and teaching practices. This is not to be overlooked given the huge 
weight the notion of presence has had, and continues to have, in what is too easily described 
by the phrase ‘Western culture’, and in turn in the academic imaginaries which can be played 
out within that culture. I would argue, then, that the seemingly explicit loss of presence which 
is felt here is in fact a more conscious echo of a generalised network effect, and one which 
again touches on the originary pharmakological dimension Derrida pointed us towards. As 
deconstruction has continued to demonstrate, the notion of presence is always a fantasy 
constructed after the fact, and one with which the founding meta-philosophical notions of 
western culture have been intimately related. What Iszatt-White has experienced, then, is an 
up-fronting or making explicit of something which is always-already at work: the impossibility 
of presence as a stable concept. It is interesting, however, that it has taken a shift in pedagogic 
approach (to one which emphasises a networked learning) that has allowed the academic to 
   
 
   
 
reflect upon this phenomenon, and to begin to address/affirm it. What might at first be seen as 
a fairly casual remark, then, is in fact something very radical; it is also potentially empowering, 
because that loss of presence comes hand in hand with a greater level of unknowability, an 
unknowability as incalculable element which is also the very possibility of thinking otherwise. 
What Iszatt-white has highlighted, then, and perhaps inadvertently, is the capacity for the 
practice of networked learning to engage a little more intimately with the quasi-originary 
medium of technological differentiation as the ground for re-thinking what educational practice 
and academic identity might be.  
A caveat to add to this, however, is that the reorientation in our relation to technology 
which is necessary if we are to affirm considered and rigorous teaching and learning practices 
in the age of industrial scale networked technologies, also opens the door to further threats to 
academic life; namely: precarity, mass surveillance and tracking, and perhaps less explicitly, a 
conflicted narrative as to the future and purpose of higher education. Indeed, as another 
participant on the networked learning project has anecdotally related, the lack of clear and 
legitimate reasoning as to the rationale for participating in such a project can quite easily be 
attributed to the inconsistencies regarding the intuitions’ strategic objectives in terms of its 
relation to, and incorporation of, digitally informed learning and teaching practices. Why, for 
example, should an academic whose career progression often hinges upon relating strong 
research to a consistent and stable identity, risk that hard-earned legitimacy by focussing on 
specific teaching practices which might undermine it? 
 
Conclusion 
In considering a relation to technology as a more general dimension, a relation which a shift to 
networked learning practices can make more apparent, we are offered a chance to encourage 
   
 
   
 
the construction of theoretically-informed knowledge within networked digital economies. We 
have seen how Stiegler’s reply to Anderson’s proposition that such technological evolution 
brings theoretical work to an end, involves a reaffirmation of the consistencies at the heart of 
critical and theoretical work, but that this reaffirmation must somehow take place within the 
very networks which seem to be eroding it. I have echoed Stiegler’s suggestion, but at the same 
time made explicit that such a task must engage at a certain level the quasi-originary or 
pharmakological dimension of technology which, as Derrida shows, can be read as the very 
medium in which difference, and therefore otherness, is produced.  
What is important to stress, however, is that it is impossible for anyone, including 
Anderson, to say once and for all where theory must begin or end, or live or die. And this is 
precisely because even the largest data sets, and the most powerful of processing capabilities, 
or the most stable of concepts (including that of ‘theory’) will always be exceeded by the 
differential medium in which that data, or those processes are inscribed. Such a medium means 
that there is always a beyond or excess of data in relation to which such data is always-already 
constituted, and that this relation is very chance of thinking differently (we might say that, if 
there is to be such a thing as theory, then this is its space or chance). Admittedly, such 
suggestions require extensive further work, both in terms of a rigorous deconstruction of all 
that is being too briefly alluded to here, including a detailed reading of what such a 
deconstruction would mean for the more practical realties of everyday academic life. With 
regards to the latter, I have suggested that a specific pedagogy, networked learning, might help 
us mediate the implications of this more radical reading of technology, and to do this in the 
particular economies and locales of our everyday academic commitments. Although we are not 
quite at the bleeding edge of a new form of academic endeavour, or yet achieved the 
reorientation of our relations to technology, neither should we take such small steps for granted. 
Rather, I want to propose that this paper acts as an indication of how we might begin, through 
   
 
   
 
affirming the ambiguous effects of the network, to think learning and teaching practice at the 
limit, and to perform it otherwise, whilst remaining within the social and technoscientific orders 
which that very affirmation may yet have the capacity to transform. 
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